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I. INTRODUCTION
In the United States, a successful litigant is generally not entitled to
recover attorneys’ fees from the opposing party absent specific statutory
or contractual authorization. This basic principle is commonly referred
to as the American Rule. Minnesota recognized and adopted the
American Rule roughly 125 years ago. A limited number of exceptions
to this longstanding rule exist, but Minnesota courts have generally been
reluctant to expand or add to these exceptions. In Minnesota, an
† John M. Bjorkman is a partner at the law firm of Rider Bennett, LLP in
Minneapolis, Minnesota. Mr. Bjorkman is a graduate of the University of Michigan, and
he graduated, Order of the Coif, from the University of North Dakota School of Law.
Mr. Bjorkman’s practice is focused on insurance coverage litigation, and he is chair-elect
of the American Bar Association’s Tort Trial & Insurance Practice Section’s Insurance
Coverage Litigation Committee. The views expressed in this article are those of the
author and not the clients he represents.
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exception to the American Rule exists for fees incurred in a declaratory
action to establish insurance coverage but only if the insurer has
breached its duty to defend.
The Minnesota Supreme Court created this exception almost forty
years ago, and there have been numerous attempts to expand it, including
the recent attempt by 3M and its amicus allies, the Commissioner of
Commerce and the Minnesota Trial Lawyers Association.
The
Minnesota Supreme Court rejected this most recent attempt to expand the
Morrison exception to the American Rule in In re Silicone Implant
1
Insurance Coverage Litigation and reaffirmed that attorneys’ fees are
recoverable in a declaratory judgment action only when the insurer
breaches its contract with the insured by refusing to defend. This article
will outline the historical underpinnings of the American Rule and its
development under Minnesota law. It will also analyze the Morrison
exception and the import of the Minnesota Supreme Court’s adherence to
the narrow exception to the American Rule it carved out roughly four
decades ago.
II. THE AMERICAN RULE
The American Rule can be traced back to the formation of the
2
United States. The American Rule represents the basic proposition that
a losing litigant generally has no obligation to pay the prevailing party’s
3
legal fees. A number of factors likely contributed to the American legal
system’s departure from the loser-pays approach followed under English
4
law. Perhaps the most commonly cited explanation for development of
the American Rule is the belief that a contrary rule would stifle access to
the judicial system because of the threat that attorneys’ fees might be
5
awarded to the prevailing party.
The American Rule has withstood numerous challenges, and courts
in the United States have steadfastly refused to adopt a “loser-pays”
approach with respect to an adversary’s attorneys’ fees. In Alyeska

1. 667 N.W.2d 405 (Minn. 2003).
2. See John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The
Injured Person’s Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1570-77 (1993) (discussing
the early development of the American Rule).
3. See Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363 (1851); Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. 306
(1796) (stating that the general practice of the United States is against allowing recovery
of attorneys’ fees as damages).
4. See Vargo, supra note 2, at 1570-77.
5. Id.
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6

Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, the United States Supreme
Court outlined the historical underpinnings of the American Rule and
refused to depart from it. In particular, the Court noted:
We do not purport to assess the merits or demerits of the
“American Rule” with respect to the allowance of attorneys’
fees. It has been criticized in recent years, and courts have
been urged to find exceptions to it. . . . But the rule followed in
our courts with respect to attorneys’ fees has survived. It is
deeply rooted in our history and in congressional policy; and it
is not for us to invade the legislature’s province by
7
redistributing litigation costs . . . .
More contemporary explanations for the development and
continued adherence to the American Rule are that the uncertainties of
litigation do not warrant penalizing an unsuccessful litigant with the
burden of paying the prevailing party’s legal fees and that litigation over
8
those fees would place an undue burden on the judicial system.
III. THE AMERICAN RULE: A MINNESOTA PERSPECTIVE
The Minnesota Supreme Court recognized the American Rule more
9
than 125 years ago. In 1874, the Minnesota Supreme Court in Kelly v.
Rogers held that a successful plaintiff was not entitled to recover
attorneys’ fees incurred in proving he had been defrauded by the
10
defendant. The court reasoned:
It is perfectly well settled that the fees of attorneys and
counsel, and other expenses of the litigation, beyond legal
costs, cannot be recovered by the plaintiff in any actions of
contract, or in those actions of tort in which punitive damages
are not allowed; for, first, these expenses are not the legitimate
consequence of the tort or breach of contract complained of;
second, to allow these expenses to the plaintiff, which are
never allowed to a successful defendant, would give the former
an unfair advantage in the contest; and, third, where, as in this
state, it is provided by statute that “the prevailing party may be
allowed certain sums, termed costs, by way of indemnity for
his expenses in the action,” it is not in the power of courts or
6. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
7. Id. at 270.
8. See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718
(1967); Vargo, supra note 2, at 1635.
9. Kelly v. Rogers, 21 Minn. 146 (1874).
10. Id. at 152-53.
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juries to increase the allowance fixed by statute, however
11
inadequate that allowance may be.
Three years later, the Minnesota Supreme Court applied the
12
American Rule in Frost v. Jordan, a contract action, and held that the
13
In
prevailing defendant was not entitled to recover attorneys’ fees.
doing so, the court recognized the unfairness and abuse that would result
from a contrary rule. In particular, the court noted:
There is no fixed standard of the value of attorney’s fees.
Some counsel charge more than others for the same services,
and some clients will pay more than others; and when both
client and counsel know that the fees are to be paid by the
other party there is a great danger of abuse. In the next place,
it is against the analogies of the law to allow expenses of
litigation beyond the costs allowed by statute, which, as said
before, however inadequate, are the measure of indemnity
which the law provides. In actions of contract and of tort, in
which punitive damages are not allowable, it is uniformly held
that attorney’s fees cannot be recovered. This is also the
prevailing and better opinion, even as to actions in tort, where
exemplary damages are allowable. Of course, we do not
overlook the distinction between such cases and one like the
present, which is on the contract of the bond; but the analogy
consists in the fact that many of the reasons for the rule in the
first are equally applicable to the second. In the third place, to
allow attorney’s fees would give the defendant in the
14
attachment suit an unfair advantage over the plaintiff.
In 1924, the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized what is often
referred to as the third-party exception to the American Rule. In
15
Bergquist v. Kreidler, the plaintiff purchased a building from Elizabeth
Kreidler based upon a representation that a tenant’s lease of the premises
was expiring shortly and that the plaintiff would be entitled to full
16
possession of the property upon completion of the purchase. In reality,
the lease did not expire for two years, and the plaintiff was forced to
17
bring suit against the tenant in an effort to remove him. That litigation
ultimately failed, and the plaintiff then commenced suit against the
11. Id. (quoting Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363 (1851)).
12 . 37 Minn. 544, 36 N.W. 713 (1887).
13 . Id. at 547, 36 N.W. at 715.
14 . Id. at 546, 36 N.W. at 714 (citation omitted).
15 . 158 Minn. 127, 196 N.W. 964 (1924).
16 . Id. at 128 196 N.W. at 964.
17 . Id. at 128-29, 196 N.W. at 964-65.
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18

seller’s son. In that action, the court held the fees incurred in the prior
suit against the tenant were damages and were recoverable from the
19
seller’s son because of his misrepresentation. In essence, the court held
that the defendant’s wrongful conduct had thrust the plaintiff into
20
Notably, the fees incurred in litigation
litigation with a third party.
21
against the son were not recoverable. In carving out this exception to
the American Rule, the court made clear its decision was “limited to the
facts of this case, and that it is not intended to hold that in all cases the
expense of litigation following torts or breaches of contract is
22
recoverable.”
In subsequent decisions, the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized
the limited applicability of the third-party exception and continued to
23
adhere to the American Rule. For instance, in Stickney v. Goward, the
court reasoned that if it allowed a prevailing party to recover attorneys’
fees, “no lawsuit would see the end, for immediately upon the entry of
judgment therein the winner could start an action against the loser for the
24
attorneys’ fees paid in obtaining the judgment.”
The court again
recognized the unfairness of any other rule and commented, “where a
defendant prevails in the ordinary tort action, no attorneys’ fees are
allowed him except as included in the statutory costs, and . . . equal
25
justice forbids treating a plaintiff more generously than a defendant.”
26
In Smith v. Chaffee, the court recognized that “there are statutory
provisions for allowing attorneys’ fees to the successful party in certain
27
kinds of actions.” Absent such statutory provisions:
The general rule is that a plaintiff, or a defendant, who
succeeds in a lawsuit and is awarded and receives the statutory
costs and disbursements taxable therein, has no further claim
against his adversary for attorney’s fees or expenses incurred
in the suit. Whether the action sounds in contract or in tort
28
makes no difference.

18 . Id. at 129, 196 N.W. at 965.
19 . Id. at 129, 196 N.W. at 965.
20. Id. at 132-33, 196 N.W. at 966.
21 . See id.
22 . Id. at 133, 196 N.W. at 966.
23 . 161 Minn. 457, 201 N.W. 630 (1925).
24 . Id. at 459, 201 N.W. at 631.
25 . Id.
26 . 181 Minn. 322, 232 N.W. 515 (1930).
27 . Id. at 324, 232 N.W. at 516.
28 . Id.
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29

In Dworsky v. Vermes Credit Jewelry, Inc., the court again
addressed the third-party exception to the American Rule. The court
recognized that legal fees are ordinarily not recoverable as damages,
“[b]ut where the wrongful act of the defendant thrusts the plaintiff into
litigation with a third person, the plaintiff may recover from the
defendant the expenses incurred in conducting the litigation against the
30
third party, including attorneys’ fees.” This holding is not inconsistent
with the American Rule. It is not a “loser-pays” rule, but merely
recognition that legal fees can, under certain narrowly defined
circumstances, be an item of damage. In this regard, it is even arguably
misleading to characterize this rule as an exception to the American
Rule.
IV. THE MORRISON EXCEPTION
In Minnesota, the first and only significant departure from the
31
American Rule occurred in 1966. In Morrison v. Swenson, the insured
purchased an automobile liability policy. The policy was canceled
32
because a premium increase was not paid.
The agent misled the
33
An accident
insured into believing the policy had been reinstated.
34
occurred, and the insurer refused to defend. The insured subsequently
prevailed in establishing the insurer was bound by the representations of
35
the agent and that coverage was available. The court held the insured
36
was entitled to recover fees incurred in the declaratory action. In doing
so, the court seemingly abandoned 100 years of case law with little or no
comment:
The only other question remaining is whether it was proper for
the court to permit plaintiff to recover his legal fees incurred in
the declaratory judgment action, although the general rule is
that legal fees are ordinarily not recoverable unless there is
statutory authority for it.
However, this action is in the nature of an action to recover
damages for breach of contract. Legal fees incurred in the
29. 244 Minn. 62, 69 N.W.2d 118 (1955).
30. Id. at 70, 69 N.W.2d at 124.
31. 274 Minn. 127, 142 N.W.2d 640 (1966).
32. Id. at 131, 142 N.W.2d at 643.
33. Id. at 132, 142 N.W.2d at 644.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 137, 142 N.W.2d at 647.
36. Id. at 138, 142 N.W.2d at 647.
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declaratory judgment action were damages arising directly as
the result of the breach. We think that the injured party in an
action of this kind ought to be permitted to recover whatever
expenses he has been compelled to incur in asserting his rights,
37
as a direct loss incident to the breach of contract.
The above passage is the sum and substance of the court’s holding
on the fee issue and seems to imply that fees were recoverable as
damages flowing from a breach of contract. Shortly after Morrison,
however, the court demonstrated just how limited its ruling was, and
dispelled any notion that any breach of contract could give rise to an
award of attorneys’ fees by making it clear that a breach of the duty to
38
defend was required.
Case law immediately following Morrison demonstrates that the
court recognized just how far it had strayed from the American Rule and
clearly shows an effort by the court to limit the scope and potential
impact of such a departure. For instance, in Abbey v. Farmers Insurance
Exchange, the court indicated that in Morrison, it was actually applying
the third-party exception to the American Rule, not creating a new
39
exception. In particular, the court noted:
While in Morrison we held, as an exception to the general rule,
that a party who is thrust into litigation with a third person by
reason of a wrongful act of another in breach of contract may
recover attorneys’ fees incurred in such prior litigation in an
action against the one who committed such wrongful act, this
court again later affirmed the general rule that attorneys’ fees
are allowed only when authorized by statute or provided for in
40
the contract.
Contrary to the court’s characterization, Morrison was not simply
the court’s application of the third-party exception to the American Rule
37. Id. at 138, 142 N.W.2d at 647 (citations omitted).
38. See Iowa Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 276 Minn.
362, 366, 150 N.W.2d 233, 236 (1967) (limiting recovery to situations involving a breach
of contract action between insurer and insured); Abbey v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 281 Minn.
113, 119, 160 N.W.2d 709, 712 (1968) (denying recovery of attorneys’ fees because
wrongful refusal to pay disability benefits does not entitle insured to recover attorneys’
fees); Rent-A-Scooter, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 285 Minn. 264, 168-69,
173 N.W.2d 9, 11-12 (1969) (limiting recovery of attorneys’ fees to actions where the
insurer erroneously denies its obligation to defend); Olsen v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins.
Co., 284 Minn. 498, 507-08, 170 N.W.2d 581, 587 (1969) (denying recovery of
attorneys’ fees not resulting from a breach of contract).
39. 281 Minn. 113, 119, 160 N.W.2d 709, 712 (1968).
40. Id. at 119, 160 N.W.2d at 711.
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because the court permitted the recovery of fees incurred in the prior
litigation against the third party, as well as the fees incurred in the
current litigation against the insurer. The Abbey decision does, however,
demonstrate the court was not entirely comfortable with the inroad on the
American Rule it had created just two years earlier, nor was it willing to
expand that inroad further.
The court’s unwillingness to expand Morrison was again evident in
41
Rent-A-Scooter, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co. In Rent42
A-Scooter, the court, again, specifically limited its holding in Morrison.
In fact, the court’s ruling makes it clear that Morrison does not stand for
the proposition that fees are recoverable in a declaratory action, even
where the insurer has breached its obligation to defend, unless the
insured has actually been thrust into litigation and forced to defend
43
itself. In Rent-A-Scooter, the insurer denied coverage and refused to
defend; however, the insured chose not to defend himself and, instead,
44
allowed a default judgment to be entered.
In refusing to allow the
insured to recover attorneys’ fees, the court held:
We hold that when an insured is compelled to defend himself
in an action because his insurer has erroneously denied its
obligation to defend him under its liability policy, the
attorneys’ fees incurred in the defense of that action may be
awarded the insured as contract damages in a subsequent
action against the insurer; but, absent statutory authority or
specific provision in the insurance contract itself, the insured
may not recover attorneys’ fees in an action against the insurer
to establish coverage under an insurance policy. Because the
plaintiff interposed no defense in the action against him,
permitting the issue to be decided by default, there is no basis
45
for an award to him of attorneys’ fees.
To the extent the Morrison decision may have implied that a breach
of contract by an insurer gives rise to the right to recover attorneys’ fees,
careful examination of the facts in Morrison, as well as subsequent
decisions of the court, make it very clear just how narrow an exception to
the American Rule the court had created. In fact, at least one court
46
concluded these subsequent decisions effectively overruled Morrison.
41. 285 Minn. 264, 173 N.W.2d 9 (1969).
42. See id. at 268-69, 173 N.W.2d at 11-12.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See W. Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Polar Panel Co., 457 F.2d 957, 962 (8th Cir. 1972)
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Although Morrison has survived as a limited exception to the American
Rule, it clearly did not and does not stand for the proposition that a
breach of contract gives rise to the right to recover attorneys’ fees.
Instead, only a breach of the duty to defend that actually thrusts the
insured into litigation and forces the insured to incur defense costs that
he or she would not otherwise have incurred is sufficient to invoke the
Morrison exception. This is a significant distinction.
V. SETTING THE STAGE FOR 3M:
BLURRING OF THE MORRISON EXCEPTION
The significant distinction between the type of breach needed to
invoke the Morrison exception and any other breach of contract still
exists in Minnesota. Dicta in more recent case law has made this
distinction less apparent. This blurring of what was initially a very
bright line gave rise to the fee dispute between 3M and its insurers. An
examination of recent case law highlights why the Minnesota Supreme
Court was required to address an issue it had seemingly resolved many
times before.
Following Rent-A-Scooter, the Minnesota Supreme Court next
addressed the recoverability of attorneys’ fees in a declaratory action in
47
Lanoue v. Firemans’ Fund American Insurance Cos.
The court
rejected the Eighth Circuit’s conclusion that Morrison had been
overruled and attempted to again demonstrate the narrow scope of the
48
Morrison exception. In analyzing Rent-A-Scooter and Abbey, the court
noted, “This court has resisted efforts to expand the Morrison holding to
allow collection of attorneys’ fees where the insured is seeking only
49
payments under the insurance coverage.”
In dicta, the Lanoue court
noted that “Morrison stands for the proposition that, where an insurance
contract is intended to relieve the insured of the financial burden of
litigation, the insured will not be required to pay the litigation costs of
50
forcing the insurer to assume that burden.” This proposition was later
51
rejected, but it did spawn further imprecision in subsequent rulings.

(“The holding of the court in Rent-A-Scooter seems to clearly overrule the earlier
Morrison decision.”).
47. 278 N.W.2d 49 (Minn. 1979).
48. See id. at 54-55.
49. Id. at 55.
50. Id. at 54.
51. Am. Standard Ins. Co. v. Le, 551 N.W.2d 923, 928 (Minn. 1996).
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For instance, in SCSC Corp. v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co., the
supreme court allowed the recovery of fees in a declaratory action where
53
the insurer breached its duty to defend.
The court cited Lanoue and
54
In doing so, however, the
Morrison as support for its conclusion.
court, again in dicta, commented, “Attorney fees are recoverable in a
declaratory judgment action only if there is a breach of a contractual
55
duty, or statutory authority exists to support such recovery.” Of course,
the only contractual duty that any court had ever found gave rise to the
right to recover attorneys’ fees was a breach of the duty to defend.
56
Similarly, in American Standard Insurance Co. v. Le, the court
addressed the issue of the recoverability of fees and, again, reiterated that
Morrison was intended to be a very narrow exception to the American
57
Rule.
The court clearly intended to limit the Morrison exception to
breaches of the duty to defend, and it noted, “with a single exception, this
court has consistently resisted efforts to expand the Morrison holding to
allow collection of attorney fees in actions which do not involve the
58
insurer’s breach of contract by failure to assume the duty to defend.”
The single exception referenced by the court in Le was Economy
59
Fire & Casualty Co. v. Iverson, which the Le court overruled to the
60
extent it was, or could be interpreted to be, inconsistent with Morrison.
The court also expressly overruled Lanoue and any other cases to the
61
extent those cases could be interpreted as inconsistent with Morrison.
Notwithstanding the court’s clear intent of limiting the Morrison
exception, it was again imprecise in describing the basis for its holding.
In particular, the court commented, “The insured is not entitled to
recover attorney fees incurred in maintaining or defending a declaratory
action to determine the question of coverage unless the insurer has
breached the insurance contract in some respect—usually by wrongfully
62
refusing to defend the insured.”

52. 536 N.W.2d 305 (Minn. 1995).
53. Id. at 319.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. 551 N.W.2d 923 (Minn. 1996).
57. Id. at 927-28.
58. Id. at 926.
59. 445 N.W.2d 824 (Minn. 1989).
60. Am. Standard Ins. Co. v. Le, 551 N.W.2d 923, 927-28 (Minn. 1996).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 927.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss2/8

10

Bjorkman: Minnesota and the American Rule: The Recoverability of Attorneys’
8 BJORKMAN - PAGINATED.DOC

2003]

12/8/2003 2:53 PM

MINNESOTA AND THE AMERICAN RULE

551

VI. IN RE SILICONE IMPLANT INSURANCE COVERAGE LITIGATION
63

In In re Silicone Implant Insurance Coverage Litigation, 3M
sought coverage from its excess insurers for losses it sustained as a result
of personal injury suits brought by claimants stemming from 3M’s sale
64
of silicone gel breast implants.
The insurance coverage litigation
involved a number of substantive coverage issues, including whether 3M
was entitled to recover attorneys’ fees and costs it incurred in pursuing
65
the declaratory action against its insurers. Notably, none of the excess
insurers had a duty to defend 3M and instead were only obligated to
reimburse defense costs incurred by 3M if, in fact, coverage under the
66
insurers’ policies were triggered.
With respect to the attorneys’ fee issue, the district court awarded
fees and costs to 3M based upon its finding that the insurers had
breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in responding to the
67
personal injury claims against 3M and its efforts to obtain coverage.
The district court concluded that this breach fell within the Morrison
exception to the American Rule and reasoned:
The Insurers did not deal fairly with 3M. Under such
circumstances an award of attorneys’ fees is appropriate, is
within the reasoning expressed in the duty to defend cases, and
is required as a practical matter if commercial general liability
insurance is to work in a coherent manner in litigious modern
68
industrial society and economy.
The court of appeals reversed the district court’s ruling on the
69
attorneys’ fee issue. In doing so, the court of appeals concluded that
the Morrison exception is limited to situations involving an insurer’s
70
breach of the duty to defend.
3M and the insurers petitioned the
71
The supreme court
Minnesota Supreme Court for further review.
accepted review of several issues, including whether attorneys’ fees were
recoverable. The Commissioner of Commerce and the Minnesota Trial
Lawyers Association (MTLA) both submitted amicus briefs to the
63. 667 N.W.2d 405 (Minn. 2003).
64. Id. at 408.
65. Id. at 409.
66 Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 423.
69. In re Silicone Implant Ins. Coverage Litig., 652 N.W.2d 46 (Minn. Ct. App.
2002) rev’d on other grounds, 667 N.W.2d 405 (Minn. 2003).
70. Id. at 73.
71. In re Silicon Implant, 667 N.W.2d at 413.
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supreme court and argued that an award of fees was proper.
3M and the Commissioner of Commerce, as an amici, argued that
an award of attorneys’ fees was proper based upon the assertion that the
duty to pay defense costs is the functional equivalent of the duty to
defend, and that a breach of either duty should give rise to an award of
73
fees. 3M also argued that Le permitted recovery of fees for any breach
74
of contract, not simply a breach of the duty to defend. The supreme
court affirmed the court of appeals’ ruling with respect to attorneys’ fees
and held fees were recoverable only when an insurer breaches its duty to
75
defend. The court expressly rejected 3M’s argument that the court’s
holding in Le implied a breach, other than a breach of the duty to defend,
76
could give rise to an award of attorneys’ fees. Furthermore, the court
refused to equate a breach of the duty to reimburse defense costs with a
77
In doing so, the court noted, “if an
breach of the duty to defend.
insurer breaches its duty to defend, the insured must do twice what it
contracted to avoid: hire attorneys and manage a lawsuit for both the
78
underlying case and the declaratory proceeding.”
Conversely, in the
reimbursement situation, an insured, such as 3M, often has specifically
contracted to retain the right to hire attorneys and control the underlying
litigation against it.
The supreme court correctly concluded that the duty to pay defense
79
costs is not the functional equivalent of the duty to defend. A breach of
the duty to defend requires the insured to defend itself. The insured is
thrust into litigation and forced to handle issues it contractually tried to
avoid, such as selecting an attorney, administering the claim, and making
settlement decisions. On the other hand, the duty to reimburse defense
costs is much more akin to the duty to indemnify because both involve
only the insurer’s duty to pay money. The supreme court previously held
that when the breach of contract is limited to a breach of a duty to pay,
attorneys’ fees incurred by the insured in forcing the insurer to make that
80
payment are not recoverable.
Where the policy merely requires
72. Id. at 408.
73. See id. at 424.
74. See id.
75. Id. at 425.
76. Id. at 424-25.
77. Id. at 425.
78. Id.
79. See id. at 424.
80. See, e.g., Garrick v. Northland Ins. Co., 469 N.W.2d 709 (Minn. 1991); RentA-Scooter, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 285 Minn. 264, 268-69, 173 N.W.2d
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reimbursement of defense costs, the insured, in defending itself, is not
being asked to do anything more than it contractually agreed to do.
Consequently, the rationale for the Morrison exception to the American
Rule is not present.
The MTLA urged the court to allow a recovery of attorneys’ fees on
the ground that attorneys’ fees are an element of damage caused by a
81
“bad-faith” breach of contract. The MTLA further urged the court to
overturn the long line of Minnesota cases that recognize a bad-faith
82
breach of contract does not give rise to extra-contractual damages.
According to the MTLA, much has changed, and “this country has come
a long way” since the court first recognized that a “bad-faith” breach of
contract does not give rise to extra-contractual damages less than twenty83
five years ago.
In reaching the conclusion attorneys’ fees were not
recoverable, the court did not directly address the MTLA’s assertions,
but it did rely upon Minnesota common law that “each party bears [its]
84
own attorney fees in absence of statutory or contractual exception.”
The court also rejected the assertion that fees were recoverable as
damages flowing from breach of the implied covenant of good faith since
3M failed to establish that any damages flowed directly from the
85
breach.
Finally, the court acknowledged the limited exception it
created in Morrison and, again, reaffirmed its unwillingness to expand
86
that exception.
The MTLA’s position that fees were recoverable as damages
obviously ignores the American Rule. In addition, in a third-party case,
a policyholder faced with a recalcitrant insurer is not, as the MTLA
suggested, left without protection for “bad faith” breaches of contract. In
third-party insurance cases, Minnesota already provides policyholders
with distinct advantages over insurers. The rules of policy interpretation
9, 11-12 (1969).
81. Brief of Amicus Curiae Minnesota Trial Lawyers Association at 8, In re
Silicone Implant Ins. Coverage Litig., 667 N.W.2d 405 (Minn. 2003).
82. Id. See Morris v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 386 N.W.2d 233, 237 (Minn.
1986); Minnesota-Iowa Television Co. v. Watonwan T.V. Improvement Ass’n, 294
N.W.2d 297, 309 (Minn. 1980); Haagenson v. Nat’l Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co.,
277 N.W.2d 648, 652 (Minn. 1979); Olson v. Rugloski, 277 N.W.2d 385, 387-88 (Minn.
1979); Wild v. Rarig, 302 Minn. 419, 440-41, 234 N.W.2d 775, 789-90 (1975).
83. Brief of Amicus Curiae Minnesota Trial Lawyers Association at 6, In re
Silicone Implant Ins. Coverage Litig.
84. In re Silicone Implant Ins. Coverage Litig., 667 N.W.2d 405, 422 (Minn. 2003)
(quoting Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302, 314 (Minn. 2002)).
85. Id. at 423.
86. Id. at 424-25.
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and construction strongly favor policyholders. In addition, a wrongful
denial of coverage, or even a reservation of rights under certain
circumstances, gives the policyholder the option to avoid all personal
liability and enter a confessed judgment that is enforceable only against
88
the insurer.
Further, an insurer that acts in bad faith and refuses to
settle a claim within its policy limits subjects itself to extra-contractual
89
damages. Given the alternative protections afforded to insureds, there
was simply no compelling reason for the court to ignore not only the
American Rule but decades of Minnesota case law refusing to recognize
a claim for bad faith breach of contract.
VII. RATIONALE FOR LIMITING THE MORRISON EXCEPTION
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s refusal to expand the Morrison
exception was sound. A contrary rule completely disregards the
American Rule with respect to its application to contractual disputes and
would have flooded the court system with legal fee disputes. The first
wave of litigation would involve parties attempting to gain special
exemption status. If any breach of an insurance contract is sufficient to
give rise to the right to recover legal fees, why should the rule be limited
to insurance contracts, and if allowed for breach of any contract, then
why only contracts? For instance, why should an individual who has
been injured by a wrongful act and been forced to sue to seek
compensation for those injuries be precluded from recovering legal fees
necessitated by that wrongful act? The answer in this state for more than
90
125 years has been the American Rule.
Once the initial litigation creating and identifying those classes of
claimants entitled to exemption from the American Rule was complete,
the court system would next be forced to deal with the reality that every
case falling within one of those special status categories will involve a
claim for attorneys’ fees. The supreme court recognized long ago that
allowing a party to recover attorneys’ fees gives that party an unfair
91
litigation advantage over his or her opponent. No litigant will give up
87. See Hubred v. Control Data Corp., 442 N.W.2d 308, 310 (Minn. 1989) (“Any
ambiguity in the insurance contract must be construed in favor of the insured.”); Atwater
Creamery Co. v. W. Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271, 276 (Minn. 1985)
(“Exclusions in insurance contracts are read narrowly against the insurer.”).
88. See Miller v. Shugart, 316 N.W.2d 729, 732 (Minn. 1982).
89. See Short v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 334 N.W.2d 384, 387-88 (Minn. 1983).
90. Id. at 713-14.
91. See Stickney v. Goward, 161 Minn. 457, 458, 201 N.W.2d 630, 630 (1925);
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the advantage provided by the existence of such a claim. In addition, if
the court had permitted the recovery of fees for a breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, every declaratory action would
have become a battleground over that issue. The existence of a claim for
“bad faith” is, unlike the majority of coverage disputes, highly factual in
nature, requiring extensive discovery and, ultimately, resolution by a
jury. This fact would undeniably complicate insurance coverage cases
by increasing discovery burdens, delaying resolution, and creating a
morass of attorney-client privilege issues.
Finally, expansion of the Morrison exception would force the court
system to deal with disputes over the reasonableness and necessity of the
92
legal fees incurred by the prevailing party.
Courts have also
recognized that litigating these types of issues creates undue burdens on
93
the court system. As the Minnesota Supreme Court noted more than
seventy-five years ago, if the court were to permit the recovery of fees,
94
“no lawsuit would see the end.”
A rule requiring a breach of the duty to defend at least has the
benefit of establishing a bright line. This bright-line rule is less likely to
lead to ancillary disputes. Moreover, a bright-line rule requiring a breach
of the duty to defend distinguishes insurance contracts from other types
of contracts. As the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized over a decade
ago in addressing another attempt to expand the Morrison exception, “If
the change in Minnesota’s historical doctrine is to be made, it seems to
95
us that this argument ought to be directed to the legislature.”
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Morrison decision was Minnesota’s first and only significant
departure from the American Rule. The rationale for such a departure is
not readily apparent from the Morrison decision itself. The Morrison
Frost v. Jordan, 37 Minn. 544, 546, 36 N.W. 713, 714 (1887); Kelly v. Rogers, 21 Minn.
146, 152-53 (1874).
92. See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718
(1967) (“the time, expense, and difficulties of proof inherent in litigating the question of
what constitutes reasonable attorney’s [sic] fees would pose substantial burdens for
judicial administration”).
93. See F.D. Rich Co. v. United States, 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974) (permitting
recovery of fees gives “us pause even though courts have regularly engaged in that
endeavor in the many contexts where fee shifting is mandated by statute, policy, or
contract”); Fleischmann, 386 U.S. at 718.
94. Stickney, 161 Minn. at 459, 201 N.W. at 631.
95. Garrick v. Northland Insurance Co., 469 N.W.2d 709, 714 (Minn. 1991).
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exception to the American Rule has, however, survived and, despite
repeated attempts, has never been expanded. The Morrison decision and
the Minnesota Supreme Court’s subsequent application and
interpretation of that decision demonstrate quite clearly that the
exception created is a very limited exception. The court’s decision in In
re Silicone Implant Insurance Coverage Litigation reaffirms the narrow
scope of the Morrison exception and, perhaps, finally puts to rest further
attempts to expand that exception. While an exception to the American
Rule for a breach of the duty to defend has questionable historical roots,
it at least has the virtue of fixing a bright line that will not unduly
complicate future litigation with ancillary issues.
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